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ABSTRACT

Internet of things (IoT) devices are emerging technology and everyday devices used worldwide that puts convenience at our
fingertips through the collection and analyzation of our physical environment via the use of sensors and internet-connected
devices. But that convenience came with the cost of IoT attacks tripling in number within the first half of 2018 compared to
the number of IoT attacks in 2017 (Kaspersky Lab, 2018). In terms of home user devices, there are smart and fitness watches,
refrigerators, and home assistants like the Google Home Assistant and the Amazon Echo Dot, and more. Although these devices
aide in making life easier, IoT devices are prone to the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that come with being connected to the
Internet. Yet, at the same time, these devices are used to create smart homes. Research by OWASP and Lopez et al. (2018) has
shown that there are several security threats to IoT that demonstrate the need to create stronger security practices. This project
investigates ongoing research of IoT exploitation, particularly by botnets, to produce simple implementation recommendations
and secure practices for home users. The aim of this research is to provide homes users with preventative methods to protect
their smart homes and devices, so they do not fall victim to botnets.
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INTRODUCTION

It is estimated that there are around 23.14 billion Internet of Things (IoT) devices connected worldwide as of 2018 (IHS). That
means there are approximately 3 devices per person based on the current worldwide population consensus, which is about 7.5
billion, according to the United States Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau). IoT is a developing technology that uses sensors and
devices to improve communication and collect, process, and analyze user data with the concept of IoT being able to allow users
to uniquely and ubiquitously identify, access, and control things (Awad and Ali, 2018). This technology exists as virtual
assistants, kitchen appliances, security systems, and watches to name a few. They also expand the functionality of the Internet
by “increasing the ability to connect multiple devices.” (Awad and Ali, 2018) The ability to connect multiple devices benefits
users with autonomy and convenience, particularly when they are used to create smart homes. Smart homes are homes that
connect multiple internet-connected devices and sensors to achieve remote monitoring, access, and control (remote and local)
of a user’s residence via a phone or computer (Awad and Ali, 2018; Oxford). The devices promote comfort, convenience,
security, and entertainment for a better user experience (Solaimani, Keijzer-Broers, Bouwman, 2013)
IoT devices, like any internet-connected device, present security challenges; and like personal computers, tablets, and smart
phones they collect, process, and analyze personal and sensitive information. Unlike devices such as computers, tablets and
smart phones, IoT nodes1 have a resource-constraint nature that does not allow traditional defense practices to be directly
enforced (Lopez, Uribe, Cely, Torres, Guataquira, Castro, Marmol, Nespoli, 2018). The lack of traditional defense practices in
IoT devices can increase attack surface, which can be used to violate the C.I.A. triad. Attack surface is an element of defensein-depth that comprises of all the different points an attacker can use to gain access to a system. These points are the reachable
and exploitable vulnerabilities (Lopez et al., 2018; Northcutt, 2011). The C.I.A. triad is a measure of security level and
represents the principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability within information security. The goal of the triad is to
keep data and information safe from unauthorized users and unauthorized alterations, all the while remaining available to
authorized user. The triad can be violated through the exploitation of IoT vulnerabilities, which in turn increases the IoT attack
surface.

1

Node: A member of a network of a point where one or more functional units interconnect transmission lines.
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According to Kaspersky Lab IoT report, “in the first half of 2018, IoT devices were attacked with more than 120,000
modifications of malware. That’s more than triple the amount of IoT malware seen in the whole of 2017.” (Kaspersky Lab,
2018) The significant increase in malware for IoT devices was sparked in 2016 with the Mirai botnet outbreak. A botnet is a
network of computers infected with malicious software and controlled as a group without the owners' knowledge, typically
used to send spam, perform distributed denial of service attacks, etc. (Oxford) Essentially, the infected device becomes a zombie
awaiting orders from the master computer. For example, the Mirai botnet’s purpose was to join infected computers together to
form a large botnet to launch distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. DDOS is a form of denial of service in which a web
server or other computer system is maliciously overwhelmed by spurious requests from many computers in different locations
on the Internet, in order to make it inaccessible or unusable (Oxford). The devices infected were Linux or Unix-based. The
infected devices – routers, IP cameras, DVRs, etc) – took orders using a command and control (C2) server to prevent being
monitored. It either awaited commands to launch a DDOS attack or a brute force attack to infect other devices (NJCCIC, 2016;
Margolis, Oh, Jadhav, Jeong, Kim, Kim, 2017). IoT technology is growing and, as mentioned earlier, there is a need to
strengthen its security. As vulnerabilities remain outstanding for IoT devices, the attack surface will only grow with the
development of IoT technology. Other botnets were created after Mirai using similar methods such as Imeij and TheMoon.
The contribution of this paper is as follows:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Review existing IoT vulnerabilities.
Detailed review about how botnets affect IoT devices and smart homes.
Propose simple implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users.
Application of proposed implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Literature review discusses smart homes, IoT networks, IoT threats and
weaponization, and IoT exploitation. Results discuss in detail the recommendation and secure practices. Methodology describes
how the proposal of implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users is created. Conclusion presents
relevant conclusions found during research and future works. Finally, appendix shows illustrations found during research that
may further some understandings.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Smart home networks are connected through more than just the wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi). Devices can also connect using radio
frequency identification (RFID), Bluetooth, near field communication (NFC), internet pool (IP), electronic product code (EPC),
and wireless sensor networks (WSN) (Awad and Ali, 2018). Regardless of the connection type, it is important for smart home
users to protect their home from within and from outside. An attack from within the home uses technology that already exists
in the home using the wired and wireless connections to exploit the vulnerable technology connected to the network. Outside
attacks use the gateway to gain access. The gateway is a hardware device such as a router or server, that allows traffic to flow
in and out of the network and is connected to the outside service provider by the access network (Chaqfeh and Mohamed,
2015). For example, Chaqfeh mentions that a direct attack on a gateway through Web server or a CGI vulnerability can result
in an attack on an entire household. This outside attack is possible because, as stated earlier, the gateway is what allows the
flow of traffic in and out of a network. An in-home attack, Chaqfeh also mentioned is “an attacker disguising itself as the
internal user through the interactive DTV, IP set top box or home pad or accesses it illegally through other means to control
the home appliances (Chaqfeh and Mohamed, 2015).”
Smart homes can be infiltrated in numerous ways. The following list few attacks based on connection used in smart homes
(Ali and Awad, 2018; Oxford; Boreli, Gharakheili, Mehani, Sivaraman, Vishwanath, 2015; Breitfuß, Haselsteiner, 2006;
Madakam, Ramaswamy, Tripathi, 2015)
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Table 1. Types of IoT connections and attacks

The unsecure connection of IoT devices provided to attackers can be weaponized against major organizations and smart home
users. For example, in 2016, the Mirai botnet mentioned earlier, played a role in a DDoS and TCP attack against a company
called Dyn that provides DNS services to other major companies such as Zillow, Hersey, CNBC, and Soundcloud. The attacks
targeted managed DNS infrastructure with the destination port 53. DDoS attacks use DNS protocol, which can make it difficult
to determine legitimate traffic from attack traffic. According to Dyn, “the impact of the attack generated a storm of legitimate
retry activity as recursive servers attempted to refresh their caches, creating 10-20X normal traffic volume across a large
number of IP address. When DNS traffic congestion occurs, legitimate retries can further contribute to traffic volume. We saw
both attack and legitimate traffic coming from millions of IPs across all geographies (Hilton, 2016).” The result of successful
DDoS attacks can be devastating to an organization. Apart from the interruption of services, successful DDoS attacks can also
result in financial loss or negatively affected brands.
According to Ho, “smart homes have a larger and more complex attack surface than existing systems because of the broad
range of heterogeneous home devices, the lack of a professional administrator to oversee and maintain these devices, a diverse
set of variable and personalized security goals that each home resident might want, and potentially new attack scenarios enabled
by cyber-physical, sensor-rich devices (Ho, Leung, Mishra, Hosseini, Song, Wagner, 2016).” Attackers can take advantage of
the attack surface by exploiting the vulnerabilities in IoT devices to carry out attacks on the smart home or use the smart home
to carry out attacks on a target.
The Mirai botnet was able to spread using a Command and Control (C2) server. When Mirai was able to connect to the server
via the infected device, the infected device would scan for other vulnerable devices. Once a victim has been identified, Mirai
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would try logging in using brute-force2 over an SSH and telnet connection. If the device was able to login, it would send the
information to another server and the Trojan would be downloaded onto the new device. When this process is complete, Mirai
will attempt to conceal itself by deleting binary and “obfuscating its process name in a pseudorandom alphanumeric string
(Margolis et al., 2017; Antonakakis, April, Bailey, Berhard, Bursztein, Cochran, Durumeric, Halderman, Invernizzi, Kallitsis,
Kumar, Lever, Ma, Mason, Menscher, Seaman, Sullivan, Thomas, Zhou, 2017).” The Mirai botnet were able to spread to
hundreds of thousands of IoT devices and attacked other companies such as OVH, Krebs on Security, and Liberia’s Lonestar
Cell within the span of 4 months (Antonakakis, et al., 2017). Other IoT botnets such as TheMoon and Imeij were created and
deployed after the Mirai outbreak.
There is no perfect security solution to completely eradicate attacks like Mirai. However, the spread of Mirai could have been
mitigated. Regarding IoT devices, the responsibility lies with both the manufacturer and home users. For instance, remote
access is part of the luxury of smart homes. The user can monitor the home while at work or on vacation. But, when home users
implement weak passwords or use default passwords, or when manufactures create devices with insecure network services,
poor encryption and authentication methods, then remote access can leave a user’s devices vulnerable to attack, increasing the
spread of malware and the IoT ecosystem’s attack surface.
RESULTS
The vulnerabilities found can be grouped into seven security groups: authentication, cryptography, education and training,
network security, patch and update, physical security, and user interface (web, cloud, and mobile interface). Each group
contains home user defense methods that list ways to defend against its respective vulnerability. The botnet-specific IoT
vulnerabilities is comprised similarly. These lists will be further appended and analyzed to create a proposed list of simple
implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users. The preposition will then be applied in a controlled
home environment. In the process of curating the vulnerabilities of IoT devices and smart homes, methods of securing the
devices for IoT manufactures became apparent.
METHODOLOGY
Using current research and literature from databases such as Science Direct and ACM digital Library, a list of known IoT
vulnerabilities will be created and botnet-specific IoT vulnerabilities will be created. The methods of exploitation of the
vulnerabilities will also be collected. Based on this information, a proposed list of simple implementation recommendations
and secure practices will be created. Application of the proposed list will be tested through a simulation of using the proposed
list to secure the devices and creating a botnet that will attempt DDoS attacks and possible propagation in a controlled
environment. The implementation recommendations and secure practices should be simple enough for any home users to
understand and implement, while retaining effectiveness. This will also be tested during the application process of this research.
CONCLUSION
Although there is no perfect security solution, there is still a need for manufactures to improve the security of IoT devices.
Smart home security has become the responsibility of both home users and manufactures. Using the proposed implementation
recommendations and security practices, smart home users can improve the security of their homes locally and remotely.
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